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Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the Shrapnel–Costa no-go theorem undermines the last
remaining viability of the view that the fundamental ontology of quantum mechanics
is essentially classical: that is, the view that physical reality is underpinned by objec-
tively real, counterfactually definite, uniquely spatiotemporally defined, local, dynamical
entities with determinate valued properties, and where typically ‘quantum’ behaviour
emerges as a function of our own in-principle ignorance of such entities. Call this view
Einstein–Bell realism. One can show that the causally symmetric local hidden variable
approach to interpreting quantum theory is the most natural interpretation that follows
from Einstein–Bell realism, where causal symmetry plays a significant role in circumvent-
ing the nonclassical consequences of the traditional no-go theorems. However, Shrapnel
and Costa argue that exotic causal structures, such as causal symmetry, are incapable of
explaining quantum behaviour as arising as a result of noncontextual ontological prop-
erties of the world. This is particularly worrying for Einstein–Bell realism and classical
ontology. In the first instance, the obvious consequence of the theorem is a straight-
forward rejection of Einstein–Bell realism. However, more than this, I argue that, even
where there looks to be a possibility of accounting for contextual ontic variables within a
causally symmetric framework, the cost of such an account undermines a key advantage
of causal symmetry: that accepting causal symmetry is more economical than rejecting a
classical ontology. Either way, it looks like we should give up on classical ontology.
1 Introduction
It should come as no surprise that many, perhaps even a good majority, of physicists after
1927 gave up on the view that the fundamental ontology of quantum mechanics is essentially
classical: that is, the view that physical reality is underpinned by objectively real, counterfac-
tually definite, uniquely spatiotemporally defined, local, dynamical entities with determinate
valued properties, and where typically ‘quantum’ behaviour emerges as a function of our own
in-principle ignorance of such entities. Let us call this position on the ontology of quantum
theory Einstein–Bell realism. Despite the gloomy forecast for Einstein–Bell realists, it is well
known that a class of responses to the canon of quantum no-go theorems, so-called causally
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symmetric local hidden variable approaches, plausibly rescues a large part of this classical pic-
ture of quantum theory.1 Indeed, causally symmetric local hidden variable approaches arguably
comprise the last refuge for Einstein–Bell realism, positioned as they are to navigate a classical
ontology through Bell’s theorem, the Kochen–Specker theorem, and the PBR theorem.
Part of the appeal of causal symmetry in this context is that it circumvents one of the integral
assumptions of these three no-go theorems—that the properties of some quantum system have
definite values independently of the measurement context to which the system is to be subject.
With respect to Bell’s theorem, this admits local hidden variables—or local beables, as Bell called
them—and with respect to the Kochen–Specker theorem, this not only admits noncontextual
hidden variables, but also provides a natural explanation for why quantum systems appear to be
contextual (as contextuality arises from the specific epistemic constraints of causal symmetry).
A more recent no-go theorem, due to Shrapnel and Costa (2018), undermines this case for
noncontextual hidden variables. In short, the Shrapnel–Costa theorem removes the loophole
open to ‘exotic causal structure’, and so implies that no ontological model, now including
causally symmetric models, that satisfy the noncontextuality assumptions of the theorem can
reproduce the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. So in order to be a feasible model
of such predictions, any causally symmetric ontology underpinning quantum behaviour must
necessarily be contextual, along with the rest of the ontological models. Making matters worse
is that the resulting form of the contextuality renders a natural explanation for this feature,
as in the case of the Kochen–Specker theorem, much less plausible. In so far as causally
symmetric local hidden variable approaches comprise the last refuge for Einstein–Bell realism,
this contextuality is a concerning predicament for classical ontology. Indeed, I argue that this
concerning predicament is as good as the end of a classical ontology for quantum mechanics.
The argument will proceed as follows. I begin in Section 2 by introducing the broad outline
of causally symmetric local hidden variable approaches to the traditional no-go theorems, and I
define Einstein–Bell realism. I focus in this section on contextuality, so introduce the ontological
models framework and the operational formulation of the contextuality problem. In Section 3,
I provide a brief outline of the history and development of the process matrix formalism and
then go on to detail the Shrapnel–Costa theorem. I consider the three assumptions of the
theorem that constrain ontological models that reproduce the statistical predictions of quan-
tum mechanics—ω-mediation, instrument noncontextuality, and process noncontextuality—
and briefly examine what a violation of each these assumptions implies. I consider in Section 4
what this means for Einstein–Bell realism and a classical ontology. I argue that, as a result of
the Shrapnel–Costa theorem, the outlook is particularly worrying for Einstein–Bell realism and
classical ontology. In the first instance, the obvious consequence of the theorem is a straight-
forward rejection of Einstein–Bell realism. However, more than this, I argue that, even where
there looks to be a possibility of accounting for contextual ontic variables within a causally
symmetric framework, the cost of such an account undermines a key advantage of causal sym-
metry: that accepting causal symmetry is more economical than rejecting a classical ontology.
1I shall not be providing an argument for or against any particular causally symmetric local hidden variable
approach here. See (Friederich and Evans, 2019; Wharton and Argaman, 2020) for good reviews of such
approaches. See also (Evans et al., 2016), in which we argue in favour of what we call the Price–Wharton
approach.
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Either way, it looks like we should give up on classical ontology.
2 Causal Symmetry and Classical Ontology
2.1 The No-Go Theorems
Following the revolution of statistical mechanics in the late nineteenth century, one could surely
be forgiven for expecting that the puzzles of quantum mechanics that emerged over the first
few decades of the twentieth century would ultimately be explained by an underlying theory,
comprised of hidden variables. This was a position for which Einstein, de Broglie, and others
argued. It was not long before a no-go theorem jeopardising this position was proposed by von
Neumann (1932), who purported to show that the probabilistic nature of quantum theory could
not be a function of an underlying theory of hidden variables. Bohm (1952) showed by way of
counterexample that there must have been something wrong with von Neumann’s theorem by
proving that the predictions of his own hidden variable model were equivalent to the predictions
of quantum theory. As a consequence of Bohm’s counterexample to von Neumann’s theorem,
Bell developed a more precise no-go theorem—Bell’s theorem (Bell, 1966)—which clarifies that
there can be no local hidden variable model that can match the predictions of quantum theory
(and that satisfy the further reasonable assumptions of Bell’s theorem).
Bell’s comments on locality have attracted considerable attention (for instance, by Norsen
(2011) and Wiseman and Cavalcanti (2017), to name just two), but this detail should not
concern us here. The basis of Bell’s assumption is that the specification of local beables at
spacelike separation must be independent conditioned on their causal pasts. There is, however,
another assumption in Bell’s theorem that is significant for our current purposes. This further
assumption is known as measurement independence, and it requires that any hidden variables
underlying a quantum system must remain statistically independent of the choice of measure-
ment settings to which that system is subject as part of the experimental procedure (Friederich
and Evans, 2019). If one were to reject the assumption of measurement independence, one
could maintain Bell’s assumption of locality by permitting beables to be correlated explicitly
with the choice of measurement setting, even if that choice occurs in the future of the quantum
system.2 Such a correlation can then be accounted for by giving up the conventional assump-
tion that causation must occur only in the forward temporal direction, such that the choice
of measurement setting might causally influence the hidden variables underlying the quantum
state in the backward temporal direction. Thus, the resulting causal symmetry denies one of
the assumptions underpinning Bell’s theorem, measurement independence, without violating
the assumption of locality. This move rescues the possibility of local hidden variables, so long
as one admits symmetric causal influences, both forwards and backwards in time.
Very shortly after Bell’s theorem followed the Kochen–Specker theorem (Kochen and Specker,
1967), which will be particularly relevant for our discussion below. This theorem states that
2Another, metaphysically distinct, way to reject the assumption of measurement independence is to remove
the freedom of agents to choose measurement settings arbitrarily, leading to superdeterministic local hidden
variables approaches (Bell, 1981, 1990; Norsen, 2011). Causal symmetry is generally more favourable than
superdeterminism on account of the fact that one can explicitly preserve the free choice of agents by rejecting
the assumption of strictly forwards-in-time causality.
3
any hidden variable model that reproduces the predictions of quantum theory must be con-
textual. A model or theory is said to be contextual when the properties attributed to some
system described by the theory are dependent upon the means of realising some value for that
property, or context of measurement or observation of those properties, beyond the actual ob-
servation itself. Thus, we can think of a noncontextual ontological property as one that can be
unambiguously distinguished experimentally. A relevant example of a context of measurement
beyond the measurement itself would be the set of further properties, if any, that are measured
in conjunction with the measurement. Since in classical mechanics there is no such dependence
on measurement context for properties attributed to systems as a result of some measurement,
classical mechanics is noncontextual. According to the Kochen–Specker theorem, any model
of a quantum system that assumes that measurements deterministically uncover the values of
pre-existing dynamical variables—such as beables—must be contextual. So, just as Bell’s theo-
rem shows that there can be no local hidden variable model satisfying his assumptions that can
match the predictions of quantum theory, the Kochen–Specker theorem shows that there can
be no noncontextual deterministic local hidden variable model that can match the predictions
of quantum theory.
However, just as we saw above that rejecting Bell’s assumption of measurement indepen-
dence, and so permitting correlations that arise as a result of symmetric causal influences,
rescues local hidden variables from Bell’s theorem, hypothesising such causal symmetry allows
a similar rejection of the assumption of measurement independence for the Kochen–Specker the-
orem. Under the assumption that the correlation between the value of any pre-measurement
hidden variables and the context of measurement can be explained by a causal influence di-
rected from the latter to the former, we can take the measurement process to be bringing about
the determinate valued properties that constitute the hidden variables, rather than uncovering
independently existing variables (Friederich and Evans, 2019). This account has the added
bonus of providing a ‘natural’ explanation for why quantum theory is contextual: the depen-
dence of any measured values on the eventual context of measurement should be expected
in a regime that admits symmetric causal influences. This is because the natural epistemic
constraints that arise when describing a physical system whose complete description depends
upon a future boundary condition result in an impoverished, statistical description of the sys-
tem conditioned only upon the initial boundary condition (see, for instance, (Wharton, 2010)).
Indeed, Wharton (2014, p.203) suggests that contextuality just is the failure of measurement
independence.
So far this brief historical narrative is straightforward. However, since contextuality is at the
heart of the Shrapnel–Costa theorem, we need to develop further layers to this narrative. The
particular way of understanding contextuality adopted by Shrapnel and Costa has its origin in
the work of Spekkens (2005). To get to grips with this treatment of contextuality, we need to
say a few words about the ontological models framework.
4
2.2 Ontological Models
The ontological models framework was first introduced in Spekkens (2005), and developed fur-
ther in Harrigan and Spekkens (2010) (see also (Leifer, 2014) and (Ringbauer, 2017) for good
reviews), and provides a formalisation of our notion of classical ontology in an operational model
of quantum processes (Friederich and Evans, 2019). As an operational model, the framework
specifies a set of possible preparations, transformations, and measurements, and associated out-
come probabilities, to describe the observed statistics over the possible outcomes. In addition,
the framework also specifies an ontological model to account for the observed statistics in the
following way.
The quantum state, ψ, is the description we give to the quantum system after the prepa-
ration procedure. We assume, however, that we can completely specify the properties of the
quantum system as a result of preparation in terms of its actual ontic state, λ, which arises
via a classical probability density, µψ(λ), over the set of possible ontic states, Λ. We can then
specify the outcome probabilities for each measurement procedure, M , conditional on λ, such
that the outcomes, {m}, are independent of the preparation procedure. We say that λ screens-
off the preparation from the measurement so that measurement outcomes only depend on the
ontic state. Leifer and Pusey (2017) call this feature λ-mediation, as the ontic state completely
mediates any correlations between preparation procedures and measurement outcomes. Impor-
tantly for our narrative here is that, explicitly according to the ontological models framework,
λ does not causally depend on the future choice of measurement procedure, M ,
P (λ |M) = P (λ) , (1)
otherwise λ could not screen off the {m} from ψ. Finally, as a result of this setup, the eventual
operational statistics given by the conditional outcome probabilities need to reproduce the
quantum statistics.
Let us add to this a useful distinction from the ontological models framework between what
Harrigan and Spekkens (2010) call ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic interpretations of the wavefunction.
In a ψ-ontic interpretation, each ontic state is consistent with a single quantum state. In a ψ-
epistemic interpretation, multiple distinct quantum states can be consistent with a single ontic
state. A further orthogonal distinction can be overlaid across this. A ψ-complete interpretation
takes the quantum state to provide a complete description of objective reality (that is, there is
a one-to-one correspondence between quantum states and ontic states), while a ψ-incomplete
interpretation requires that the quantum state be supplemented with additional ontic degrees of
freedom (such as, for instance, in typical ψ-ontic pilot-wave interpretations). Given this latter
distinction, ψ-epistemic interpretations are naturally ψ-incomplete, and render the wavefunc-
tion a representation of the knowledge of the user of the formalism rather than a representation
of objective reality. For ψ-epistemic interpretations in the ontological models framework, there
exists an ontic state underlying the wavefunction.3
We can apply this framework to our analysis of Bell’s theorem above. The ontological
3Beyond the ontological models framework, a ψ-epistemic wavefunction can be given an anti-realist or oper-
ationalist interpretation that makes no such claim for a deeper underlying objective reality.
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models framework is explicit that λ does not causally depend on the measurement procedure
(1), which is, of course, simply Bell’s assumption of measurement independence. As we saw
above, by denying this assumption and accounting for the correlation between hidden variables,
or the ontic state λ, and the measurement procedure by way of causal symmetry, we can rescue
the assumption that any beables are local. As a result of this move, then, we can see that the
admission of causal symmetry is a ready made violation of the assumption of a strict temporal
and causal order for the ontological models framework (Ringbauer, 2017, p.94).
As a very brief aside, and before we continue with our explication of contextuality in quan-
tum theory, we now have the tools to summarily deal with the causal symmetry response to
the PBR theorem (Pusey et al., 2012). The PBR theorem states, in short, that the ontic states
of any interpretation of quantum mechanics that fits within the Bell framework and reproduces
the Born rule must be in one-to-one correspondence with the quantum states. This, of course,
is simply the definition of a ψ-ontic interpretation of the wavefunction. Thus, the PBR theo-
rem appears to be ruling out ψ-epistemic approaches to the wavefunction. However, since the
PBR theorem is framed in the ontological models framework, it is straightforward to note as
before that it does not apply to causally symmetric approaches. Just as with Bell’s theorem,
admitting causal symmetry rescues the possibility of an interpretation of the wavefunction as
an epistemic representation of an underlying reality of local beables.
Let us return then to contextuality. Spekkens (2005) pioneered a new way of thinking of
contextuality beyond the formulation of Kochen and Specker (1967). According to Spekkens’
characterisation, an ontological model of an operational theory is noncontextual when opera-
tionally equivalent experimental procedures have equivalent representations in the ontological
model (Spekkens, 2005, p.1). Thus, contextuality on this account implies that operationally
equivalent experimental preparation procedures may correspond to inequivalent ontic state
representations (and where the state additionally depends on the context of measurement).
Defining contextuality in this way, rather than in terms of the deterministic uncovering of
the values of pre-existing dynamical variables, renders the assumption of noncontextuality as
a principle of parsimony: no ontological difference without operational difference.4 Despite
this difference in flavour, Spekkens’ diagnosis of hidden variable approaches concludes with
the same result. Assuming that there are ontic properties underlying the observed statistical
behaviour of quantum systems, and that the associated ontic states are distinct just when there
are corresponding operational differences, cannot account for the statistical behaviour entailed
by quantum theory. The result is then that there is no noncontextual ontological model that
can reproduce the observed statistics of quantum theory.
Just as we saw above with respect to Bell’s theorem and the PBR theorem, however, in so
far as the no-go theorems can be characterised in the ontological models framework, the no-go
theorems are undermined by the assumption of causal symmetry. Thus Spekkens’ more general
understanding of contextuality in terms of the ontological models framework suffers the same
response: causal symmetry is a categorical rejection of the assumption of a strict temporal
4Spekkens (2019) argues that this generalised noncontextuality is an embodiment of Leibniz’ Principle of the
Identity of Indiscernibles, and labels this principle the Leibnizian methodological principle. Schmid et al. (2020)
formalise this principle under the term Leibnizianity. We consider this principle again in Section 4.
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and causal order that underpins the ontological models framework. Noting this is the main
result of this section of the paper: in so far as there is a motivation to avoid the consequences
of the above no-go theorems, particularly to maintain some semblance of a classical ontology,
hypothesising causal symmetry is a strategy that is well placed to achieve this.
The no-go theorems are ordinarily taken to demonstrate that the underlying conceptual
and ontological framework of quantum theory cannot be completely classical, and cannot be
about local, noncontextual hidden variables. Any hope one might have for hanging on to such
a classical ontology rests with causally symmetric local hidden variable approaches, as per
our story here. Whilst such approaches are admittedly unorthodox, and even perhaps in a
sense ‘nonclassical’ on account of causal symmetry, what is significant about such approaches
is that they have the potential to rescue an objectively real, counterfactually definite, uniquely
spatiotemporally defined, local, noncontextual (or where any contextuality is underpinned by
noncontextual epistemic constraints), determinate valued ontology, where typically ‘quantum’
behaviour emerges as a function of our own in-principle ignorance of such entities (Friederich
and Evans, 2019).
As I propose in Evans (2015) (and also in Friederich and Evans (2019)), the distinction that
Quine (1951) draws between the ‘ontology’ and the ‘ideology’ of a theory is an apt distinction
to understand the value of the above argument. According to Quine, the ideology of a theory is
comprised of the set of ideas that can be expressed by a theory, and thus ideological economy
is then a measure of the economy of primitive undefined statements employed to reproduce
this ideology. Put in these terms, one of the consequences of the above narrative is that the
ideology of causal symmetry is more economical than a rejection of classical ontology. The main
goal of the current work is to make clear how the Shrapnel–Costa no-go theorem significantly
jeopardises this position. In short, motivated by the ‘get out of jail free’ card that causal
symmetry is able to play with respect to the no-go theorems, Shrapnel and Costa develop a
no-go theorem that closes off the ‘measurement independence’ loophole to any approach that
assumes an ‘exotic’ form of causality.
Before we consider the Shrapnel–Costa theorem in Section 3, let us once more explicitly state
our characterisation of classical ontology by adopting the framework which my collaborators
and I have elsewhere called Einstein–Bell realism (Evans et al., 2016), bringing together the
above analysis of the no-go theorems.
2.3 Einstein–Bell Realism
Consider the following conditions from Evans et al. (2016), called the Einstein–Bell conditions,
adapted here to nonrelativistic quantum theory:
(i) Quantum mechanical probabilities are epistemic;
(ii) Quantum mechanics is local;
(iii) Quantum mechanics is consistent with the no-go theorems.
We can think of Einstein–Bell realism as the conjunction of these conditions with the as-
sumption that there is an objective reality.
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There is good reason for calling this view Einstein–Bell realism. It should be clear to see
that the first condition epitomises the sentiment that Einstein expressed to Born in 1926 that
“God does not play dice”.5 This also has implications for any ensuing interpretation of the wave-
function. Consider the distinction above between ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic interpretations of
the wavefunction. Harrigan and Spekkens (2010) argue that Einstein, in his more sophisticated
arguments for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, advocated for a realist ψ-epistemic
interpretation. Despite the fact that there are some ψ-ontic, ψ-incomplete interpretations—like
pilot-wave interpretations—in which probabilities arise as a function of our ignorance over the
full ontic degrees of freedom, and so are epistemic, the basic probabilistic concepts that oc-
cur in all ψ-epistemic interpretations are clearly also themselves epistemic. Thus, ψ-epistemic
interpretations are natural bedfellows for epistemic notions of probability (Evans et al., 2016,
p.6).
The second assumption epitomises not only Einstein’s implicit appeal to consistency between
quantum theory and relativity (as in, for instance, Einstein et al. (1935)), but also the exclusion
of spacelike separated influences formalised in Bell’s own theorem (as in, for instance, Bell
(1976)). For clarity, and following Evans et al. (2016, p.5), we can take the assumption here to
mean that physical bodies and influences can only follow timelike or null spacetime trajectories,
and so these trajectories must obey Lorentz covariance. The third assumption reflects that a
plausible interpretation of quantum theory must obey the constraints established by the above
no-go results, that is, from Bell’s theorem, the Kochen–Specker theorem, and the PBR theorem.
Employing the Einstein–Bell conditions, we argue in Evans et al. (2016) that causally sym-
metric local hidden variable approaches constitute a unique realist interpretation satisfying
these constraints. Our logic there is straightforward. The first condition requires a ψ-incomplete
interpretation, as epistemic probabilities cannot be accommodated by ψ-complete interpreta-
tions. The second and third conditions together exclude ψ-ontic interpretations, as such in-
terpretations cannot be local according to the no-go theorems, implying that only ψ-epistemic
interpretations can meet the Einstein–Bell conditions. Furthermore, a causally symmetric ap-
proach circumvents the results of Bell’s theorem, and so can be a local hidden variable theory,
also circumvents the PBR theorem, and so permits a ψ-epistemic wavefunction, and also con-
tains an explicit contextuality of the ontic state on the experimental procedure, so fits within
the bounds given by the Kochen–Specker theorem. So we can see that the commitments of
Einstein–Bell realism capture what we mean by local beables, or by noncontextual local hidden
variables: a commitment to a local-realist ontology underlying a ψ-epistemic wavefunction.
Causally symmetric hidden variable approaches are, according to the arguments in Evans et al.
(2016), the only approaches that fit these constraints. As we will now see, however, these
constraints have just gotten prohibitively tighter.
3 The Shrapnel–Costa No-Go Theorem
Shrapnel and Costa (2018) argue that exotic causal structures—such as causal symmetry—
are incapable of explaining quantum behaviour arising as a result of noncontextual ontological
5To be clear, I take this as a statement of determinacy rather than determinism.
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properties of the world. As we have just seen, one of the key underlying assumptions of the
Kochen–Specker theorem is that quantum phenomena arise on a fixed background forwards-in-
time causal structure, and so do not preclude the possibility of more exotic causal structures
providing an ontologically classical (noncontextual) explanation. This leaves open the possi-
bility of symmetric causal structure allowing noncontextual ontological properties to underpin
quantum behaviour, and also providing a natural explanation for why typically quantum be-
haviour can arise from such a noncontextual ontology.
The Shrapnel–Costa theorem is stronger than the Kochen–Specker theorem, as it closes
off the possibility of exotic causal structure providing just such a noncontextual explanation of
quantum behaviour. In fact, it shows that any ontology underpinning quantum behaviour must
be contextual; moreover, “what is contextual is not just the traditional notion of “state”, but
any supposedly objective feature of the theory, such as a dynamical law or boundary condition,
which is responsible for the experimentally observed statistics” (Shrapnel and Costa, 2018,
p.2). In order to take account of the possibility of exotic causal structure, the Shrapnel–Costa
theorem first generalises the ontological models framework, and then employs the process matrix
formalism, which is suited to describing processes with indefinite causal structure. To get to
the heart of the Shrapnel–Costa theorem, then, let us begin by reviewing the process matrix
formalism.
3.1 Process Matrix Formalism
The development of the process matrix formalism is punctuated by a number of independent
redevelopments. The roots of the formalism stretch back to Accardi (1976) and Lindblad
(1979) on the dynamics of open quantum systems and quantum stochastic processes in the
1970s. This early work is framed in the language of algebraic quantum field theory. The
development of quantum information theory at the beginning of this century allowed for some
of the ideas corresponding to those from the dynamics of open quantum systems to be recast
into a modern form, whereby, for instance, ‘non-Markovian quantum stochastic processes’ has
become ‘quantum channels with memory’. In the field of experimental quantum information,
process matrices began to be popularised in the analysis of quantum process tomography of
quantum optical systems (see, for instance, (O’Brien et al., 2004; Riebe et al., 2006; Kok et al.,
2007; Mohseni and Lidar, 2007; Riebe et al., 2007))—whereby processes matrices were usually
obtained experimentally from quantum state tomography (O’Brien et al., 2004). However, much
of the contemporary discussion regarding the process matrix formalism can be traced back to
the seminal work of Kretschmann and Werner (2005), couched in the language of quantum
information theory, and developed largely independently of the earlier work on open quantum
systems.
In short, a process matrix—to be defined below—is a way of representing the state trans-
formation denoted by the completely positive map, MA(ρ), generated by the evolution of a
quantum state, ρ, from an input state space, HA1 , to an output state space, HA2 , by some
quantum operation, MA : L(HA1) → L(HA2). A key step to developing the process ma-
trix formalism is the realisation that the Choi–Jamio lkowski isomorphism (Jamio lkowski, 1972;
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Choi, 1975), which establishes a correspondence between linear maps and linear operators,
allows the linear map MA : L(HA1)→ L(HA2) to be conveniently rewritten as a linear opera-
tor MA1A2 ∈ L(HA1 ⊗HA2).6 Following on from Kretschmann and Werner (2005), the ‘Pavia
group’ employed this Choi–Jamio lkowski representation to describe transformations on a net-
work of quantum gates, and developed a methodology for optimising such quantum circuits
using what they call a quantum comb: a temporally ordered physical process with a quantum
memory (Chiribella et al., 2008a, 2009). (Incidentally, the quantum comb has been indepen-
dently redeveloped no less than two more times (Modi, 2012; Luchnikov et al., 2018).) They
further demonstrated that simple quantum circuits can be physical implementations of what
they call quantum supermaps, mapping an input quantum operation to an output quantum
operation (Chiribella et al., 2008b).
At about the same time, and independently, Gutoski and Watrous (2007) also employed
the Choi–Jamio lkowski representation to represent what they call quantum strategies: a spec-
ification of the exchange and processing of quantum information in a quantum process. This
development is largely equivalent to the quantum comb (along with the operator tensor formu-
lation of quantum theory (Hardy, 2012), which contains close similarities). The Pavia group,
however, went on in the ensuing years to develop and analyse the quantum control of temporal
order in the quantum switch, where two operations are enacted in a quantum superposition of
the two possible temporal orders (Chiribella, 2012; Colnaghi et al., 2012; Chiribella et al., 2013).
The significance of the quantum switch here is that the process matrix formalism developed as
the ideal formal system for describing such indefinite causal order.
Hardy (2005) introduces the notion of indefinite causal structure in the context of quantum
gravity, and Oeckl (2003), also motivated by quantum gravity, considers a “general bound-
ary” formulation of quantum mechanics that does not assume anempha priori causal structure
(and which overlaps significantly in the quantum context with the two-state vector formalism
(Aharonov et al., 1964)). However, it is Oreshkov et al. (2012) who analyse indefinite causal
order in the context of quantum processes: they employ the Choi–Jamio lkowski representation,
and a local causal direction, to derive a causal inequality violated by timelike and spacelike
correlations with a global causal direction. It is this work on process matrices and indefinite
causal order that has in part led to the development of quantum causal modelling (Leifer and
Spekkens, 2013; Cavalcanti and Lal, 2014; Costa and Shrapnel, 2016; Allen et al., 2017), the
framework within which Shrapnel and Costa build their no-go theorem.
The utility of the process matrix formalism is that it provides a framework to describe
communication tasks between parties that lack a definite causal order. Given a set of parties
each residing in their own laboratory, A,B, . . ., one assumes that each party is able to act locally
on some system that passes once through their laboratory, where local operations are described
by ordinary quantum mechanics. No assumption is made concerning the relative spatiotemporal
arrangement of the laboratories, nor that there is ultimately some causal structure within which
the laboratories are positioned.
Following Oreshkov et al. (2012), the operations that any such party can perform are delin-
eated by a quantum instrument, MA, which induces—by way of a unitary transformation and
6See (Adlam, 2020) for more on the interpretation of the Choi–Jamio lkowski isomorphism.
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projective measurement—a transformation from input to output,MAi , indexed by the outcome,
i = 1, . . . , n. MAi is a completely positive (CP) trace-non-increasing map. The set of all CP
maps for some instrument—which when taken together, {MAi }ni=1 ≡ MA, exemplify the fact
that with probability one there must be some outcome of the application of the instrument—is
a CP and trace-preserving (CPTP) map.
For a set of parties, the set of all outcomes across the laboratories corresponds to a set of
CP maps,MAi ,MBj , . . ., and the complete list of probabilities P (MAi ,MBj , . . .) for all i, j, . . . is
what Oreshkov et al. (2012, p.3) call a process. The process thus exemplifies all the operational
correlations between local laboratories. An important assumption that Oreshkov et al. make
at this point is that each such joint probability is noncontextual, in the sense that the joint
probability for any set of CP maps is not dependent on the local detail of any particular
instrument MA. It is most obvious here in this characterisation of ‘process’ the way in which
it can be seen as a generalisation of ‘state’: both can be seen as encoding a list of probabilities
over a set of measurement scenarios.
Since, as above, the linear mapsMAi andMBj can be represented, using the Choi–Jamio lkowski
isomorphism, by the linear operators MA1A2i and MB1B2j , respectively, the joint probability for
two measurement outcomes (i at A and j at B) can be expressed as a function of the corre-
sponding Choi–Jamio lkowski operators (Oreshkov et al., 2012, p.4):





Here, WA1A2B1B2 is known as the process matrix, under the condition that it is positive semi-
definite (WA1A2B1B2 ≥ 0)—which embodies the constraint that the instrumentsMA andMB
are CPTP maps—and its trace is one (Wood, 2009).
The process matrix is readily understood as a generalisation of a density matrix—and so
can be seen as a generalisation and extension of the notion of state—and the trace rule (2) as a
generalisation of the Born rule (Oreshkov et al., 2012). Further, more restrictive assumptions
allow one to reduce the process matrix to the quantum state (when the output systems are
one-dimensional), to reflect the characterisation of a quantum comb or network (when a definite
causal order is fixed), or to represent quantum channels with memory (when only unidirectional
signalling is possible).
With this brief survey of the process matrix formalism, let us turn our attention to the
Shrapnel–Costa no-go theorem.
3.2 Causation Does not Explain Contextuality
Shrapnel and Costa begin by outlining a generalised operational framework to reflect the on-
tological models framework of Spekkens (2005). However, they are interested in replacing the
operational notions of preparation, transformation, and measurement procedures with more
temporally and causally neutral concepts. They replace these operations with the general
notion of local controllables, ĨA, where each local controllable is indexed to a local region,
A,B, . . ., and each choice of local controllable is labelled by an outcome, a, b, . . .. Furthermore,
the physical features of the world external to the system, and independent of the choice of local
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controllables, including “any global properties, initial states, connecting mechanisms, causal
influence, or global dynamics”, responsible for correlating outcomes between local regions they
call the environment, W̃ . Importantly, any variable correlated with the choice of local control-
lable is necessarily considered an outcome and cannot be part of the environment (Shrapnel
and Costa, 2018, p.5).
They define an event, MA: =[(a, ĨA)], as an operational equivalence class of pairs of outcome
and local controllable, such that the joint probabilities over outcomes are equivalent for all
possible outcomes and local controllables in all the other regions and for all environments
(Shrapnel and Costa, 2018, p.7). In the process matrix framework (that is, in the quantum
context) this is analogous to the role played by the CP maps MAi , which we can call here
quantum events. They define an instrument, IA, similarly as an operational equivalence class
of lists of possible (that is, with non-zero probability) events, MA; that is, IA: ={MAi }. This is
analogous to the role played by the CPTP mapsMA in the process matrix formulation, which
recall are labelled quantum instruments.
Moreover, just as we noted above that the joint probability P (MAi ,MBj , . . .) is noncontex-
tual, in the sense that it is not dependent on the local detail of any particular instrumentMA,
the probability of some event MA, so long as IA renders MA possible, is independent of the
particular instrument I. Thus, as above, correlations between events across different regions
are not a function the details of the instrument, which itself specifies events that do not hap-
pen, and so events screen-off instruments. Shrapnel and Costa call this operational instrument
equivalence and note that it is equivalent to noncontextuality in the former sense (Shrapnel
and Costa, 2018, p.13).
Finally, they define a process, W : =[W̃ ], as an operational equivalence class of environments,
such that the joint probabilities over outcomes given local controllables are equivalent across
the equivalence class of environments. In the quantum context, W is the process matrix. This
generalisation of outcomes, local controllables, and the environment into events, instruments,
and the process serves to operationalise any joint probability distribution to allow the creation
of an ontological model—along the lines of the ontological models framework—that underlies
the distributions that we take to account for the observed statistics.
The major shift enacted by Shrapnel and Costa from the ontological models framework of
Spekkens (2005) and Harrigan and Spekkens (2010) to ontological models in the process matrix
framework is to move away from the idea that the ‘state’ encodes the ontology of some system
towards the idea that more general properties of the environment are responsible for mediating
correlations between the regions. As such, they replace the ontic state λ with the ontic process
ω (Shrapnel and Costa, 2018, p.8):
our ontic process captures the physical properties of the world that remain invariant under
our local operations. That is, although we allow local properties to change under specific
operations, we wish our ontic process to capture those aspects of reality that are independent
of this probing.
Those aspects of reality that the ontic process captures are those parts of the environment that
are not within the control of the experimenters, like initial conditions, causal influences, and
global dynamics.
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Shrapnel and Costa then make three natural assumptions that they take an ontological
model in their framework to obey. Firstly, they replace the notion of λ-mediation (as per (Leifer
and Pusey, 2017) above) with the notion of ω-mediation, in which the ontic process ω completely
specifies the properties of the environment that mediate correlations between regions, and
screens off outcomes produced by local controllables from the rest of the environment (Shrapnel
and Costa, 2018, p.8):
P (a, b, . . . | ĨA, ĨB, . . . W̃ ) =
∫
dω P (a, b, . . . | ĨA, ĨB, . . .)P (ω | W̃ ) . (3)
Secondly, they define the notion of instrument noncontextuality as a law of parsimony (much
like (Spekkens, 2005)): operationally indistinguishable pairs (a, ĨA), (a′, Ĩ′A) should remain
ontologically indistinguishable. That is, ∀b, c, . . . ĨB, ĨC , . . . , ω (Shrapnel and Costa, 2018, p.9):
P (a, b, . . . | ω, ĨA, ĨB, . . .) = P (a′, b, . . . | ω, Ĩ′A, ĨB, . . .) . (4)
This allows them to define a probability distribution on the space of events, conditional on
instruments and the ontic process, P (MA,MB, . . . | ω, IA, IB, . . .), in terms of a function that
maps events to probabilities. As Shrapnel and Costa point out, instrument noncontextuality
is formally identical to operational instrument equivalence, except for the fact that instrument
noncontextuality includes the ontic process.
Thirdly, they define the notion of process noncontextuality: operationally indistinguishable
W̃ , W̃ ′ should remain ontologically indistinguishable (Shrapnel and Costa, 2018, p.9).
P (ω | W̃ ) = P (ω | W̃ ′) . (5)
Again, this allows them to define a probability distribution on the space of ontic processes, in
terms of a function that maps ontic processes to probabilities.
The Shrapnel–Costa no-go theorem is then that there can be no ontological model that
satisfies ω-mediation, instrument noncontextuality, and process noncontextuality. They argue
as follows. As we have just noted, each of instrument and process noncontextuality defines a
function that maps from the space of events, {MA,MB, . . .}, and ontic processes, ω, respec-
tively, to probabilities. However, the two noncontextuality assumptions force these functions to
be ordinary positive probability distributions. Since quantum expectation values cannot be ex-
pressed in this way, no instrument and process noncontextual ontological model can reproduce
the quantum statistical predictions.
3.3 Interpreting the Result
So what does this result mean, exactly? Well, to begin with, beyond pointing out the intended
consequence of their theorem, Shrapnel and Costa do not speculate on further consequences
in any great detail. The intended consequence is that, since preparations, transformations,
and measurements have been replaced by local controllables, there is no further assumption
in the no-go theorem that ω is correlated with some controllables but independent of others.
Recall that this is the form of the ‘loophole’ in the orthodox ontological models framework
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through which we are able to thread causally symmetric local hidden variable approaches to
defeat the nonclassical consequences of the no-go theorems from Section 2. The part of the
theorem doing most of the heavy lifting on this point is ω-mediation. By replacing λ-mediation
with ω-mediation, the relevant correlations are not simply a function of the quantum state,
but the agent-independent rules or laws that we take the environment to contribute to the
dynamical behaviour of a system, and the connection between local action and observed events.
Where causal symmetry is ideally placed to circumvent λ-mediation, no such causal assumption
can do so for ω-mediation. Thus, this loophole is closed off in the Shrapnel–Costa theorem,
rendering causally symmetric approaches just as contextual as the rest of the models captured
by the ontological models framework (Friederich and Evans, 2019). So causally symmetric
local hidden variable approaches, on account of being ontological models, must violate one of
the assumptions of the Shrapnel–Costa theorem to hope to match the statistical predictions
of quantum mechanics.7 In so far as this sets a challenge to causally symmetric approaches,
the discussion in the next section explores the possibility of meeting this challenge. To this
end, while Shrapnel and Costa note only briefly the consequences of violating each of their
assumptions, let us consider precisely what such violations entail.
The consequences of violations of the assumption of ω-mediation are not limited to trans-
gressions against a realist attitude towards the ontology of quantum systems. As we noted just
above, the assumption of ω-mediation insinuates that there are observer-independent aspects
of the world, such as boundary conditions and global dynamics, that are ‘there’ to be discov-
ered by the experimental procedure. Violations of this assumption do not just offend realist
attitudes towards the state, then, but would require a radical rethink of the nature of scientific
inquiry and our role as observers in that process.
Shrapnel and Costa have notable things to say about the assumption of instrument contex-
tuality. Firstly, it is interesting to note the possibilities that they consider in which ontological
models that satisfy instrument noncontextuality could be interpreted, from an ordinarily time-
oriented perspective, as contextual (Shrapnel and Costa, 2018, p.11–13). This is the same
phenomenon at play as the one employed by causally symmetric approaches with respect to
measurement noncontextuality. As we saw above in Section 2.1, the ‘added bonus’ of causally
symmetric approaches to contextuality in the Kochen–Specker theorem was that it provided a
natural explanation for this contextuality in terms of epistemic constraints that arise from the
ordinary temporal orientation of observers. However, the nonextendibility result in the case
of measurement noncontextuality—that no noncontextual extension of quantum theory can
provide more accurate predictions of outcomes (Chen and Montina, 2011)—holds in the case
of instrument noncontextuality, too. That is, no instrument noncontextual hidden variable
can provide more information than is contained in the process matrix (Shrapnel and Costa,
2018, p.17). This result rules out nontrivial hidden variable extensions such that obtaining
greater predictive power for quantum theory can only be achieved by the addition of contextual
variables.
Violations of the assumption of instrument noncontextuality would imply that correlations
7Superdeterministic hidden variable models, also on account of being ontological models, fare no better at
meeting this challenge.
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between events across different regions depend upon the details of the quantum instrument—in
particular, on the CP maps that are not employed as part of the choice of local controllable—
and so on events that do not in fact happen. Interestingly, this would imply that events do
not screen-off instruments, and so lends weight to the idea that contextuality is a species of
fine-tuning (Cavalcanti, 2018). This flavour of noncontextuality has strong similarities to prepa-
ration and measurement noncontextuality, and thus the ontological consequences of violations
of these have received considerable attention already (see, for instance, (Harrigan and Rudolph,
2007; Leifer, 2014)). Since these do not represent a particularly novel type of consequence for
the Shrapnel–Costa theorem, I will not labour these consequences here.
The consequences of violations of the assumption of process noncontextuality are certainly
novel. Process contextuality implies that operationally equivalent arrangements of an exper-
iment do not necessarily lead to equivalent ontic descriptions of that experiment. What is
significant about this is that included in this ontic description are (Shrapnel and Costa, 2018,
p.18):
all aspects of a physical scenario other than the choices of settings and the observed out-
comes. . . Such aspects include what kind of systems are involved, the laws describing such
systems, boundary conditions, etc.
Thus, it seems that process contextuality would have a devastating effect on our ability
to conduct orthodox scientific inquiry. The implication here is that operationally equivalent
experimental arrangements may be realised by inequivalent ontic states, global properties,
causal mechanisms, laws, or boundary conditions—indeed, any part of the environment that
is not within the control of the experimenters. It is difficult to imagine exactly what this
means, ontologically speaking. However, I speculate in the next section that one solution to
a previously identified problem with a particular causally symmetric approach may provide a
suggestion as to what process contextuality could amount.
4 The End of a Classical Ontology?
We are now in a position to assess the prospects for causally symmetric local hidden variable
approaches to quantum theory in the face of the Shrapnel–Costa theorem and, in so far as
such approaches are the only approaches that fit the constraints of Einstein–Bell realism, with
them the prospects for Einstein–Bell realism and a classical ontology. To some, the loss of the
possibility of a classical ontology is surely no news at all; as I noted in the opening sentence
to this work, many physicists gave up on the view that the fundamental ontology of quantum
mechanics is essentially classical after 1927, and certainly after the Bohr-Einstein debates ran
their course beyond 1935 (Einstein et al., 1935; Bohr, 1935).
Thus the first obvious option in response to the Shrapnel–Costa theorem is to accept that
any rescue effort for Einstein–Bell realism is now determinately impossible. If one wanted, one
could still maintain that the wavefunction be interpreted as ψ-epistemic, so long as there were
no classical ontology underlying the wavefunction description (as in some versions of QBism
(Fuchs et al., 2014)). Alternatively, one could maintain a realist attitude towards the quantum
formalism by adopting a ψ-ontic interpretation, with or without additional ontic degrees of
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freedom. Perhaps the clearest avenue here is a ψ-ontic wavefunction without additional ontic
structure (such as the many-worlds interpretation (Wallace, 2012)), as one must keep in mind
that any additional ontic degrees of freedom would need to be nonlocal and/or contextual.
However, is there a way to rescue Einstein–Bell realism? I see only two remaining options.
The first is to undermine the Shrapnel–Costa theorem, possibly by rejecting one or more un-
derlying assumptions. It is a difficult task to identify the most appropriate foundations to
challenge, but perhaps rethinking the nature of causality, inference, and/or probability might
be a fruitful place to begin searching.8
Schmid et al. (2020) propose a generalisation of causality and inference—what they call a
causal-inferential theory—with the express intention of avoiding the consequences of the tra-
ditional no-go theorems that rule out local or noncontextual realist approaches. They make
the suggestion that previous such generalisations that can be employed to provide diagnoses of
the true consequences of the no-go theorems “scramble” the ontological and epistemological as-
pects of this problem. The previous generalisations they mention include the ontological models
framework from above (Spekkens, 2005), quantum generalisations of propositional logic (‘quan-
tum logic’ (Jauch and Piron, 1963; Gudder, 1969; Mittelstaedt, 1976)), operational probability
theories (which originate from the Pavia group (Chiribella et al., 2010)), generalised probability
theories (beyond quantum logic (Hardy, 2001)), and a nonclassical generalisation of Bayesian
inference (Leifer and Spekkens, 2013). What is significant about this proposal is the way that
Schmid et al. are explicitly attempting to “salvage” the notions of locality and noncontex-
tuality, and so salvage, at least in part, a classical ontology. A rough outline of their main
conjecture is as follows.
Recall that in Section 2.2 we were introduced to the term Leibnizianity that Schmid et
al. employ to characterise generalised noncontextuality. Their formalisation simply captures
the proclamation that there should be no ontological difference without operational difference.
They claim that the traditional noncontextuality no-go theorems constrain logical space, as
we noted above in Section 2.1, to either contextual realist approaches—and so to violations
of Leibnizianity—or to approaches that forego some aspect of realism about the quantum
state. The key claim of Schmid et al. is that they identify that it is indeed possible to
have a Leibnizian realist interpretation of quantum theory, but only so long as the causal and
inferential components are inherently nonclassical. While they do not provide any great amount
of detail, they note that quantum causal modelling (Leifer and Spekkens, 2013; Cavalcanti and
Lal, 2014; Costa and Shrapnel, 2016; Allen et al., 2017) is likely to play a significant role in
the development of any such realist interpretation, as well as more abstract characterisations
of probability theory (Fritz, 2020). While the sentiment of this project is laudable, I make
merely two cautionary comments in passing. As a rejoinder to the involvement of quantum
causal modelling, it seems as though the Shrapnel–Costa theorem, which itself is built on
the principles of quantum causal modelling, will make it difficult for any such generalisation
on its own to salvage noncontextuality. On the involvement of abstract characterisations of
8Hofer-Szabó (2020) considers the possibility of giving up on Spekkens’ definition of generalised noncontextu-
ality, which also underpins the Shrapnel–Costa theorem, and simply permitting unproblematically the possibility
of a quantum system responding differently to different measurements represented by the same operator.
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probability theory, any generalisation of probability theory that salvages noncontextuality that
is non-Kolmogorovian faces the contention—brought by Feintzeig and Fletcher (2017)—that
it simply does not offer any clear advantage, in terms of, say, guiding rational action, over
contextual theories with ordinary Kolmogorovian probability.
The second remaining option for rescuing Einstein–Bell realism is arguably the more in-
teresting for proponents of causal symmetry. This option would entail biting the bullet on
contextuality, and either (i) considering the contextuality merely apparent and finding some
natural explanation for it in terms of noncontextual ontic structure and some epistemic con-
straint, or (ii) accepting that quantum theory is underpinned by contextual ontic structure and
then accounting for how the world might conspire to render this contextuality operationally
undetectable in a classical setting (or, perhaps even both (i) and (ii)). The former, of course,
is the method by which causally symmetric approaches meet the challenge of the Kochen–
Specker theorem and the ontological models framework. The natural explanation there is that
an observer’s ordinary temporal orientation constrains epistemic access to the future causes
that influence the properties of some quantum system’s beables, and so make these ultimately
noncontextual hidden variables seem contextual from the observer’s perspective. The ideal
response for proponents of causal symmetry in the current scenario would be to identify a
corresponding epistemic, or otherwise, constraint that shows how apparent contextuality can
arise from actual noncontextuality. While I do not have a definitive argument to demonstrate
the plausibility of such an account, I would like to make a speculative suggestion for the sort
of constraint and corresponding consequences that might be required for this task.
However, before I do, it is worth pushing the dialectic of this work towards the following in-
convenient conclusion. If the primary motivation for adopting a causally symmetric framework
is to rescue Einstein–Bell realism, then we have just seen that the Shrapnel–Costa theorem ren-
ders this task either impossible, or at best beholden to the possibility of some further account
explaining how, say, apparent contextuality arises from some noncontextual footing. However,
and importantly, even if such an account could be found, it still may not be enough to rescue
Einstein–Bell realism. Whether it does or not hangs on how ‘natural’ the account is. As we saw
in Section 2.2, one of the strengths of causally symmetric approaches that rescue Einstein–Bell
realism from the traditional no-go theorems is that the ideology of causal symmetry is more
economical than a rejection of classical ontology. However, it is difficult to see how any account
that introduces potentially artificial constraints or complex mechanisms can be proposed with-
out significantly reducing the ideological economy of causal symmetry, jeopardising the very
grounds upon which one might consider the approach more virtuous (Friederich and Evans,
2019).
Thus, in response to the Shrapnel–Costa theorem, the outlook is particularly worrying
for Einstein–Bell realism and classical ontology. Not only is the obvious consequence of the
theorem is a straightforward rejection of Einstein–Bell realism, but even where there looks
to be a possibility of accounting for contextual ontic variables within a causally symmetric
framework, the cost of such an account could result in a dramatic decrease in the ideological
economy of causal symmetry, and so render the rejection of classical ontology favourable on
grounds of scientific virtue. Either way, it looks very difficult to maintain a classical ontology
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for quantum theory.
Despite this pessimistic prognosis, I will finish this part of the dialectic with a speculative
suggestion of where I see the most promising kind of possibilities for Einstein–Bell realism in the
face the Shrapnel–Costa theorem. In Evans et al. (2016) we considered some peculiar problems
faced by what we call the Price–Wharton approach to causally symmetric local hidden vari-
ables in the context of a universal ψ-epistemic wavefunction (which we refer to as Ψ-epistemic
quantum cosmology). The problem is the following. The Price–Wharton approach poses a
two-time boundary value problem for the kinematics of the underlying hidden variables. Addi-
tionally, as a result of the traditional no-go theorems, initial data on a Cauchy surface forming
a well-posed Cauchy problem and comprised of local, noncontextual classical variables cannot
possibly recover the statistical predictions of quantum theory. This is despite the fact that
the initial data about the quantum state on the same Cauchy surface perfectly well comprise
a well-posed Cauchy problem, due to the parabolicity of the Schrödinger equation. That the
ontic state variables on the initial Cauchy surface do not comprise a well-posed Cauchy problem
should be expected, though, as a two-time boundary problem requires additional information
from the final boundary to obtain a complete determination between the boundaries. So suf-
ficient initial data on a Cauchy surface to form a well-posed Cauchy problem would lead to
an overdetermination of the ontic state at the final boundary. One way around this that we
consider is that the laws governing the ontic state variables cannot be parabolic or hyperbolic
PDEs.
However, there is an alternative, more speculative possibility that we briefly consider in this
context, albeit one that is set to one side in Evans et al. (2016). The ontic state variables do
solve a Cauchy problem, but are also determined as a two-time boundary problem (so as to
circumvent the no-go theorems). The tension generated by this overdetermination is addressed
by a constraint on the free action of an agent controlling the nature of the data on the initial
and final boundary. We put it as follows (Evans et al., 2016, p.7):
the tension that would need to be resolved is between: (i) the solution of a Cauchy problem
from freely, arbitrarily and (ideally) completely specifiable initial data; and (ii) the symmetric
expectation that the final boundary be equally freely, arbitrarily and completely specifiable.
One way to escape this tension would be to remove the freedom to completely specify data
on the final boundary: an agent controlling the final boundary would just happen to ‘choose’
a measurement that concords with the deterministic evolution of the ontic state. However,
this would break the symmetry between the final and initial boundaries and would also remove
the element of control that renders the Price–Wharton picture causally symmetric. To retain
the symmetry would thus require some as-yet-unspecified principled constraint that limits an
agent’s ability to freely, arbitrarily and completely specify both initial and final boundary data.
This constraint must be such that the aspects of the ontic state on the initial Cauchy surface
that are a consequence of the choices specified at the final boundary are not epistemically
accessible before the final boundary is specified—and vice versa.
The significance of this possibility for the dialectic around the Shrapnel–Costa theorem is
the following. Consider the nature of this proposed constraint on an agent’s ability to control
the boundary data. One way for this constraint to work would be to limit agential control over
the complete specifiability of data on both the initial and final boundary (in the same way as
one can perform quantum measurements, but cannot control the precise outcome). Another
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way for this constraint to work would be to limit, say, the time intervals at which an agent can
specify data on initial and final boundaries. Without such a temporal constraint, we should
expect the data on the initial and final boundaries in a two-time boundary value account to be
generally related by elliptic PDEs. However, one could imagine, albeit in a highly speculative
fashion, that if the distance between the boundaries were constrained to certain discrete time
intervals—perhaps frequent enough to be practically undetectable to the agent—the initial and
final ontic state variables could be related consistently by some hyperbolic PDE.9 This would
apparently resemble a well-posed Cauchy problem over the ontic state variables on the initial
boundary, but those variables would be at least partly determined by the ontic state on the
final boundary. There would be overdetermination in such a case, but the overdetermination
would be fine-tuned so as not to create a contradiction. An agent would then be similarly
constrained to intervene on a system at specific times on pain of generating a contradiction in
the hidden variables that describe the kinematical properties of some quantum system between
the boundaries.
This speculative example is interesting because of its potential realisation of process contex-
tuality. According to process contextuality, the parts of the physical system that are contextual
could include ontic states, global properties, causal mechanisms, dynamical laws, and boundary
conditions. This implies that these features of the ontic process might depend upon the context
of measurement. This seems to be a feature of the above example: the ontic state variables on
the boundaries, and whether they are modelled by, say, elliptical or hyperbolic dynamical laws
depends upon, say, the precise time intervals across which the agent is able to intervene on the
system. In addition, this account looks highly fine-tuned, which also appears to be a feature of
process contextuality. Could this then be a case of process contextuality?
Moreover, the imagined (and admittedly unspecified) constraint on the agent that limits the
agent’s capability “to freely, arbitrarily, and completely specify both initial and final boundary
data” to specific time intervals should ultimately, with the right detail, render such a causally
symmetric local hidden variable approach process noncontextual, as the constraint removes
the above-mentioned contextuality (but admittedly for the price of fine-tuning). This, by
my lights, appears to qualify as biting the bullet on contextuality as per the Shrapnel–Costa
theorem, but also as having such process contextuality be merely apparent. This is because the
apparent contextuality would simply be a feature of our continuous-time model of the causally
symmetric hidden variables, which themselves are determined on a discrete-time basis due to
the constraint. Provided that the imagined constraint could be given a ‘natural’ explanation
(which I have certainly not attempted here), the process contextuality could be accounted
for in terms of noncontextual ontic structure and some agent-centred constraint. However,
there must be considerable doubt concerning whether such a constraint could provide a natural
explanation, at the very least because it explicitly introduces fine-tuning into the explanation
9One could think of this as roughly analogous to turning a ‘thick’ sandwich problem into a ‘thin’ sandwich
problem in geometrodynamics (Baierlein et al., 1962; Wheeler, 1964; Misner et al., 1973). This problem in
geometrodynamics is motivated by the corresponding problem in electrodynamics, where the free specification
of data on two boundaries with periodic boundary conditions can be made consistent by stipulating that the
interval of time between the two boundaries is an integer multiple of a half period of the harmonic oscillation
of the field (Wheeler, 1964, p.355).
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of how apparent contextuality arises from a noncontextual ontic state. So long as one thinks
that a Leibnizian principle of parsimony is a good guide to scientific methodology, fine-tuning
of this sort is not a virtue of a theory—and it is moreover worth noting that, due to the
nonextendibility result above, the addition of noncontextual ontic structure cannot provide
more information than is contained in the quantum description.
I do not mention this speculative example here to argue in its favour, by any means. My
purpose here is to provide a demonstration of the sort of argumentation that would be required
as part of what is arguably the only reasonable path forward for the Einstein–Bell realist. What
is required is an account of, say, apparent process contextuality that has these sorts of features.
This moreover demonstrates the interrelation between the naturalness of the constraint and the
ideological economy of the model: unless the constraint makes use of uncontroversial features
of time, space, agency, and so on, it will face a hard task keeping the ideology economical.
5 Final Thoughts
Is this the end of a classical ontology for quantum mechanics? Yes, I think this has to be the
end. Perhaps there is hope that locality and noncontextuality can be salvaged by an appro-
priate generalisation of probability theory and the characterisation of inference. However, the
path ahead for the causal symmetry program looks less hopeful. While there is an open logical
possibility that a causally symmetric hidden variable approach might be able to provide a nat-
ural explanation of how a noncontextual ontic state might appear to be contextual on account
of some low-cost constraint, this seems at the present moment highly unlikely. What is more,
the nonextendibility result implies that any noncontextual ontic state cannot contribute to the
predictive power of quantum mechanics—any such contribution can only be made by additional
instrument-contextual variables. So any such logical possibility is unlikely to render accepting
causal symmetry more economical than rejecting a classical ontology, and will necessarily fail
to contribute to increased predictive power for quantum mechanics. In so far as this unlikely
logical possibility is the last refuge for Einstein–Bell realism, it looks like we should give up on
Einstein–Bell realism and, with it, classical ontology.
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